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Abstract
Background: The assessment of social attribution skills in children can potentially identify and quantify
developmental difficulties related to autism spectrum disorders and related conditions. However, relatively little is
known about how these skills develop in typically developing children. Therefore the present study aimed to map
the trajectory of social attribution skill acquisition in typically developing children from a young age.
Methods: In the conventional social attribution task (SAT) participants ascribe feelings to moving shapes and
describe their interaction in social terms. However, this format requires that participants understand both, that an
inanimate shape is symbolic, and that its action is social in nature. This may be challenging for young children, and
may be a potential confounder in studies of children with developmental disorders. Therefore we developed a
modified SAT (mSAT) using animate figures (e.g. animals) to simplify the task. We used the SAT and mSAT to
examine social attribution skill development in 154 healthy children (76 boys, 78 girls), ranging in age from 6 to 13
years and investigated the relationship between social attribution ability and executive function.
Results: The mSAT revealed a steady improvement in social attribution skills from the age of 6 years, and a
significant advantage for girls compared to boys. In contrast, children under the age of 9 years performed at
baseline on the conventional format and there were no gender differences apparent. Performance on neither task
correlated with executive function after controlling for age and verbal IQ, suggesting that social attribution ability is
independent of cognitive functioning. The present findings indicate that the mSAT is a sensitive measure of social
attribution skills from a young age. This should be carefully considered when choosing assessments for young
children and those with developmental disorders.
Background
The ability to understand the state of mind and inten-
tions of other people is a critical faculty of man. It helps
predict the behavior of others and is essential for appro-
priate social interaction. Conventional ‘Theory of Mind’
(ToM) tests of this skill have been criticized because
they may rely too heavily on cognitive ability and fail to
capture social skills needed in more ‘naturalistic’ condi-
tions [1]. The ‘Social Attribution Task’ (SAT) is an
adept measure of social skills which does not have com-
plex reasoning demands [1,2]. In the original paradigm
participants are shown a movie of 2 triangles and a cir-
cle moving around and in and out of a rectangle. These
2D shapes do not resemble people but typically develop-
ing individuals tend to spontaneously describe the
actions in anthropomorphic terms endowing them social
intentions, emotions, and personalities. Descriptions of
relationships between the shapes are offered (e.g. friend),
their actions are considered to have social intent (e.g.,
trapping, protecting), and the mental states of the var-
ious shapes are suggested. How a participant responds
in the SAT provides a window onto their ability to
ascribe social meaning to behavior. Klin extended the
use of the SAT to uncover theory of mind limitations in
people with autism who performed well on ‘false belief’
ToM tasks [1]. Subsequently the SAT has been adopted
as a useful measure of the ability to infer beliefs and
intentions in autism [3,4].* Correspondence: rckchan@psych.ac.cn
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The ability to derive social meaning from visual sti-
muli is thought to develop spontaneously from early
infancy. As the experience of social interaction increases
social attribution skills become increasingly honed. Six
to 8 year old children perform inconsistently when
describing the SAT, and Thommen and colleagues
found that children create ever more ambitious plots
from age 7 [5-7]. Together studies suggest social attribu-
tion ability may not fully develop before the age of 8
years old. Thus, given that even typically developing
children from younger age groups do not perform the
SAT as well as older children or adults, using the task
to study young participants with autism or other devel-
opmental disorder is potentially problematic [5].
The actual developmental trajectory of social attribu-
tion skills has not been systematically examined and is
the focus of the present study. Given concerns regarding
the appropriateness of the conventional SAT to younger
children, we designed a modification of the SAT
(mSAT) with animate rather than ambiguous stimuli.
These stimuli should more readily be expected to inter-
act in a social manner and therefore we predicted the
task would be easier for younger children. The develop-
mental trajectory of social attribution skills was then
assessed using this version of the SAT in parallel with
the conventional task.
The extent to which the development of social skills is
part and parcel of more general cognitive maturation is
debated. Mentalizing ability has been reported to corre-
late with executive function, especially tasks involving
inhibitory control, even after controlling for age, gender,
and verbal ability [8,9]. However, other evidence sug-
gests that ToM is a discrete dimension, dissociable from
other cognitive functions, and one which matures rela-
tively independently from other skills [10]. For example,
individuals with high functioning autism have marked
difficulties with social interaction but relative sparing of
other cognitive faculties [10-13]. Conversely, ToM is
selectively spared relative to a general cognitive impair-
ment in people with neuro-developmental disorders
such as Down’s and Williams’ syndromes. This double
dissociation between ToM and other high-level cognitive
skills is taken as evidence that ToM is indeed a distinct,
domain-specific skill. Therefore in this study we also
examined the relationship between executive function
and social attribution skills measured in both versions of
the SAT.
Methods
Pilot study
The materials in the modified version of SAT (mSAT)
were five cartoons including ‘bridge’, ‘small dog’, ‘pig,
wolf, and fox’. These were designed using the Macrome-
dia Director MX 2004 program to have an enriched
social content and to capture social situations that might
be encountered in everyday life. The aim was to maxi-
mize younger viewers’ tendency to recognize socially
expressive actions and reactions. The basic procedures
followed for the mSAT were the same as those described
for the SAT by Klin [1,14]. Participants were shown the
cartoons twice and asked to talk about the content. The
first account was unprompted. In the second account,
the experimenter promoted the participant to see the sti-
muli as characters. In the final account 3 parts of the car-
toon were shown again and specific questions were
asked. For example questions asked included the name of
the stimulus (e.g. a dog), and a description of the action
(e.g. helping). Finally the children were asked why they
thought an interaction was occurring between 2 charac-
ters. Coding followed the protocol given in Klin [1,14]. In
brief, Pertinence Index, was the proportion of total pro-
positions which were vague and/or misattributed and/or
irrelevant and/or inconsistent. The Salience Index, was
the proportion of highly salient attributions made. The
Theory of Mind Index: Cognition, was the proportion of
total propositions which had mental state terms. The
Theory of Mind Index: Affective, was the proportion of
total propositions which contained emotion terms. The
Animation Index, coded the overall quality of social attri-
bution ability. The Person Index, coded the extent to
which physical, behavioral, relationship or psychological
details were used when asked what sort of ‘people’ the
stimuli were. The Problem solving Index, was the propor-
tion of correct answers given to direct questions about
cartoons.
Inter-rater reliability
Two independent and experienced raters scored
responses blindly and in random order based on the 8
indices as defined in the conventional SAT [1]. The
range of inter-rater reliability (Kappa agreement) for the
modified SAT and SAT was 0.7 - 0.94 and 0.71 - 0.94,
respectively, calculated from a random selection of 20
children (10 boys, 10 girls) aged 6 years (mean IQ =
99.80, SD = 14.06).
Test-retest reliability
Test-retest reliability of mSAT and SAT was carried out
using data from the same 20 children over a 4 week per-
iod. The test-retest reliability (Pearson r) for mSAT
indices were all p < 0.01: Propositions (r = .89), Perti-
nence (r = .88), Salience Index (r = .90), ToM-Cognitive
Index (r = .86), ToM-Affective Index (r = .84), Anima-
tion Index (r = .87), Person Index (r = .89) and Problem
Solving (r = .88). The test-retest reliabilities (Pearson r)
for SAT indices were all p < 0.05: Propositions Index (r
= .85), Pertinence Index (r = .87), Salience Index (r =
.82), ToM-Cognitive Index (r = .88), ToM-Affective
Index (r = .73), Animation Index (r = .79), Person Index
(r = .80) and Problem-Solving Index (r = .76).
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Concurrent validity
The concurrent validity for each index of the mSAT and
SAT was calculated in the oldest group of children and
showed that for this age group the 2 versions character-
ized social attribution skill similarly. Propositions (r =
.87, p < .001), Pertinence (r = .80, p < .001), Salience
Index (r = .78, p < .001), ToM-Cognitive Index (r = .83,
p < .001), ToM-Affective Index (r = .91, p < .0017), Ani-
mation Index (r = .93, p < .001), Person Index (r = .90,
p < .001), and Problem Solving (r = .92, p < .001).
Study of age-related development of social attribution
skill
Participants
A sample of 154 children (76 boys, 78 girls) was
recruited from regional primary and middle schools in
Guangzhou, China. The mean age of the total sample
was 9.88 years (SD = 2.30) and the mean IQ was 106.67
(SD = 13.98). All participants were right-handed and no
behavioral or academic difficulties had been recorded in
their annual school or parental reports. Exclusion cri-
teria were a diagnosed developmental disorder (e.g., aut-
ism, ADHD), major medical disorder (e.g., epilepsy), or
regular medication. Teachers invited them to participate
and their parents give consent for participation in the
present study, as approved by the local institutional
review board. Participants were made aware that their
responses would be recorded in writing and audio-taped
and all responses were recorded verbatim. They were
divided into eight year groups from 6 - 13 years old but
tested in random order. Descriptive statistics for each
age group are given in Table 1.
Materials
General cognitive ability and executive function testing
The short form of the Chinese version of the Wechsler
Intelligence Scale for children – Revised (WISC-R) was
used to assess general cognitive ability [15]. Tests of ver-
bal ability included arithmetic, vocabulary, and digit
span; tests of performance ability included block design
and object assembly. An Executive function battery
incorporated the following conventional tests following
standard protocols:
Cognitive flexibility assessed using the modified ver-
sion of WCST; Inhibitory control measured with the
Chinese version of the Stroop test (Victoria version,
adapted Chinese version) and Verbal fluency quantified
by asking the participants to name as many animals as
possible in 1 minute [16,17].
Procedure
The SAT, mSAT and cognitive test battery were admi-
nistered in random order to each child in 3 × 20 min
sessions held over 1 week.
Data analysis
SAT and mSAT scores were analysed in two-way ana-
lyses of variance (ANOVA) with age and gender (8 ×
2) as between-subjects variables. Planned comparisons
and/or post hoc comparisons with the Newman-Keuls
test with Bonferroni corrections were conducted to
further define any significant effect of age, gender or
interaction (significance was assumed at a value of p <
.05). The relationship between test variables was esti-
mated using Kendall’s rank correlation coefficients and
partial correlations, depending on the distribution of
the data. All analyses were performed on SPSS 13.0.
Results
Table 2 and Table 3 list means and standard deviations for
each age level on the SAT and mSAT indices. Table 4 pre-
sents main effects in 8 age groups, gender, and the age (8)
× gender (2) interaction among age groups of SAT and
mSAT indices. Figure 1 displays a summation of all indices
in both tasks across the age groups studied. It illustrates
that, although both versions captured a significant devel-
opmental improvement in social attribution skills [F
(7,146) = 57.496, p = 0.0005 for original SAT; F(7,146) =
62.286, p = 0.0005 for mSAT], a floor effect in younger
age groups (6 - 9 years) was clearly evident in the SAT
data. Performance on SAT and mSAT did not correlate
with verbal IQ. In general, girls out-performed boys on a
number of SAT and mSAT indices including ToM.
Partial correlation analysis controlling for age and
verbal IQ was conducted to explore the relationships
between social attribution ability and executive func-
tion. The results showed scores from executive func-
tion measures were generally not related to the SAT
and mSAT indices score after controlling for age and
verbal IQ (Table 5). The exceptions were significant
correlations between the Problem-Solving Index and
the number of categories of WCST completed (r =
.225, p = .014); the Proposition Index and verbal flu-
ency (r = .311, p = .001), and the Salience Index and
verbal fluency (r = .240, p = .009).
Discussion
The main findings in this study are summarized below:
Table 1 Demographic and Cognitive Characteristics by all age groups (mean; SD)
Group (boys: girls) 6-yrs (10:10) 7-yrs (10:10) 8-yrs (10:11) 9-yrs (10:9) 10-yrs (10:10) 11-yrs (11:9) 12-yrs (9:10) 13-yrs (6:9)
VIQ 96.00 (10.74) 98.65 (7.68) 103.48 (13.17) 109.74 (15.56) 112.05 (13.79) 105.10 (13.86) 114.00 (13.33) 112.73 (11.12)
PIQ 110.25 (20.42) 105.50 (15.71) 106.90 (17.04) 116.74 (12.59) 115.65 (18.09) 104.95 (28.33)
FSIQ 99.80 (14.06) 102.70 (10.41) 104.71 (12.96) 113.58 (14.04) 115.45 (15.58) 107.95 (15.36)
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1. The mSAT showed a steady improvement in social
attribution skills with age (Figure 1). However, the con-
ventional SAT showed a floor effect between the ages of
6 and 9 years and a year on year improvement
thereafter.
2. Girls outperformed boys in half of the parameters
in the mSAT.
3. Social attribution ability was not linked to executive
function in typically developing children.
The developmental pattern of social attribution in school-
aged children
One of the primary purposes of this study was to char-
acterize the developmental progression of social attribu-
tion ability in healthy school-aged children. As expected,
the present findings showed social attribution skills
advance with age in this sample. However, the conven-
tional SAT was insensitive to changes between the ages
of 6 and 9 years, while the mSAT picked up the
improvements made in these younger age groups.
The results of performance on the Salience Index in
both versions of the SAT strongly indicate that the
mSAT is easier for younger children. In the conven-
tional SAT, younger children described around 27% of
the social events, while older children described 45%.
This contrasts the mSAT in which younger children
found 42% of the social elements, and older children
71%. Thus it seems that young children do not tend to
readily attribute the ambiguous geometric stimuli in the
conventional task with social meaning. Conversely the
stimuli in the mSAT may be more accessible for social
evaluation in this age group.
Although the mSAT appeared to be simpler for
younger age groups, the task still elicited a smaller
repertoire of mental state terms from young children
Table 2 Performance on SAT measures among 8 age groups (mean; SD)
SAT 6-yrs 7-yrs 8-yrs 9-yrs 10-yrs 11-yrs 12-yrs 13-yrs
Proposition 5.75
(.79)
5.90
(1.25)
6.05
(.97)
6.32
(1.53)
7.15
(1.35)
7.25
(1.29)
8.63
(1.12)
9.00
(.85)
Pertinence .06
(.10)
.04
(.08)
.03
(.08)
.03
(.07)
.03
(.06)
.04
(.08)
.00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
Salience .27
(.05)
.28
(.07)
.29
(.06)
.31
(.08)
.35
(.07)
.35
(.07)
.43
(.06)
.45
(.04)
ToM Cognitive .05
(.08)
.06
(.10)
.10
(.13)
.05
(.09)
.07
(.11)
.09
(.11)
.08
(.10)
.10
(.09)
ToM Affective .00
(.00)
.03
(.06)
.02
(.06)
.02
(.06)
.04
(.08)
.03
(.08)
.06
(.09)
.05
(.08)
Animation 1.00
(.65)
1.40
(.50)
1.43
(.68)
1.37
(.50)
1.60
(.88)
1.70
(.73)
3.05
(.52)
3.13
(.52)
Person .90
(.31)
1.50
(.89)
1.19
(.81)
1.47
(.96)
1.95
(.94)
1.90
(.79)
3.32
(.58)
4.00
(.53)
Problem-solving .34
(.12)
.37
(.11)
.38
(.17)
.34
(.11)
.48
(.16)
.41
(.13)
.72
(.18)
.85
(.15)
Table 3 Performance on mSAT measures among 8 age groups (mean; SD)
mSAT 6-yrs 7-yrs 8-yrs 9-yrs 10-yrs 11-yrs 12-yrs 13-yrs
Proposition 6.60
(1.19)
7.00
(.97)
8.14
(1.31)
8.89
(.94)
9.50
(1.15)
9.65
(1.53)
10.11
(1.70)
10.67
(1.35)
Pertinence .06
(.11)
.02
(.05)
.06
(.09)
.04
(.08)
.04
(.09)
.03
(.05)
.00
(.00)
.00
(.00)
Salience .42
(.10)
.46
(.07)
.51
(.11)
.57
(.08)
.61
(.09)
.63
(.10)
.67
(.11)
.71
(.09)
ToM Cognitive .16
(.08)
.23
(.13)
.27
(.11)
(.11) .29
(.11)
.28
(.11)
.35
(.13)
.41
(.07)
ToM Affective .06
(.08)
.07
(.09)
.17
(.08)
.17
(.09)
.18
(.08)
.21
(.11)
.21
(.10)
.23
(.08)
Animation 1.60
(.50)
1.95
(.76)
2.90
(.54)
3.00
(.47)
3.30
(.57)
3.25
(.79)
3.32
(.82)
3.53
(.92)
Person .65
(.81)
1.60
(.88)
2.76
(.77)
2.95
(.78)
3.15
(.59)
3.30
(.80)
3.63
(.50)
3.93
(.59)
Problem-solving .34
(.12)
.62
(.15)
.80
(.17)
.78
(.19)
.86
(.19)
.84
(.19)
.89
(.15)
.88
(.16)
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compared to older children. The conventional SAT also
captured fewer mental state attributions in younger age
groups, but showed minimal increase in these indices
with age (4% to 10% for ToM-Cognitve index and 0% to
5% for ToM-Affective index). Importantly, the mSAT
was sensitive to age-related changes in mentalizing abil-
ity, revealing a significant increase in ToM skill with age
(16% to 41% for ToM-Cognitive index and 4% to 23%
for ToM-Affective index). This latter indicates the
mSAT may have an advantage when assessing possible
developmental delay in mentalizing ability in young chil-
dren compared to the conventional SAT.
Consistent with a general pattern of improvement in
social skills with age, both the mSAT and SAT results
showed older children scored significantly higher on the
Animation index, a measure of the “capacity” for social
attribution [1]. Similarly older children scored signifi-
cantly higher on the Person index reflecting their greater
appreciation of the complexities of personality. Younger
children were constrained to personal judgments invol-
ving simple size and shape attributes. In addition, a bet-
ter grasp of social situations in older children compared
to younger children was documented by their accuracy
in Problem solving in both SAT ratings (85% for SAT
and 88% for mSAT).
Taken together, the results point to important differ-
ences in social attribution skills of younger children
compared with older children. Up to 7 years old, chil-
dren preferentially explain events in physical terms even
in the mSAT cartoon (e.g., going for a ride then feeding
her horse hay). During middle childhood (8-10 years),
children begin to consider the intentions behind the
motion on screen (e.g., running away from a bully
because he knew he’d take his lunch). By the age of 11
years, the mental states of the characters were a core
component of the monologues and often drew upon
personal experience and a rich understanding of human
traits (e.g., being afraid to ‘speak up’ because she learned
the hard way that it didn’t pay). It seems the acquisition
of social attribution skills progresses through an early
grasp that physical actions have outcomes. In older chil-
dren these actions can be more readily understood
within a social framework with psychological conse-
quences. A mature social attribution ability allows the
oldest children to evaluate scenarios not just on the
Table 4 Main effects in 8 groups of age, gender, and the Age × Gender interaction among age groups of SAT and
mSAT Indices
SAT Index Age Gender Interaction
F p Post Hoc Significant differences F p F p
Proposition 19.352 .0005 6-9&10-11&12-13 3.625 .059 .767 .616
Pertinence 1.734 .106 No differences 2.432 .121 2.337 .028
Salience 20.471 .0005 6-9&10-11&12-13 5.469 .021 1.140 .342
ToM Cognitive .776 .608 No differences 1.630 .204 .367 .920
ToM Affective 1.354 .230 No differences .015 .902 .702 .670
Animation 26.199 .0005 6-9&10-11&12-13 1.181 .279 .581 .770
Person 34.099 .0005 6&7-9&10-11&12&13 2.116 .148 1.249 .281
Problem-Solving 30.121 .0005 6-11&12&13 5.573 .020 1.425 .200
mSAT Index
Proposition 23.422 .0005 6-7&8-9&10-11&12-13 2.399 .124 .534 .808
Pertinence 1.925 .070 No differences .217 .642 1.000 .434
Salience 21.260 .0005 6-7&8-9&10-11&12-13 2.048 .155 .760 .622
ToM Cognitive 8.374 .0005 6&7-11&12-13 11.598 .001 1.755 .101
ToM Affective 10.214 .0005 6-7&8-13 17.190 .0005 1.253 .278
Animation 22.738 .0005 6-7&8-9&10-13 7.697 .006 3.611 .001
Person 46.059 .0005 6&7&8-11&12-13 .399 .529 3.061 .005
Problem-Solving 25.880 .0005 6&7&8-13 8.604 .004 .914 .498
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Figure 1 The development pattern of SAT and mSAT indices.
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overt actions taking place, but also on the social interac-
tions driven by the mental states of the characters
involved.
Gender difference in social attribution ability
In addition to the developmental pattern of social attri-
bution ability, we also identified a gender effect on this
ability. Girls tend to have a general developmental
advantage over boys of the same age[18]. Consistent
with this, we found that social attribution skills in girls
were more advanced than boys on both tasks; girls out
performed boys on half of the social attribution indices,
on the other indices there was no effect of gender.
There appears to be important gender differences in the
way children approach social problems and solve inter-
personal conflicts [19]. The literature suggests that girls
are rather more socially adept than boys. They grasp the
intentions of others more competently, and more easily
formulate effective solutions to social problems [20].
However, few investigators have specifically examined
gender differences in mentalizing and the present results
indicate such gender differences in development of
social skills deserve further attention.
The relationship between social attribution ability and
other cognitive abilities
A large number of studies have shown that ToM task
performance is correlated with verbal ability [21-23].
The most straightforward explanation for this is that
conventional ToM tasks are tested verbally. While it
could be argued that verbal ability must also impact
upon performance of SAT and mSAT, we found that
after controlling for age, there was no relationship
between SAT/mSAT and verbal IQ. In addition we
observed no relationship between social attribution abil-
ity and executive function. This suggests that social
attribution ability, at least as tested in the SAT, is a
domain-specific ability that is independent of executive
functioning [11]. This fits with evidence that mentalizing
skills and executive function have distinct neural sub-
strates [24,25]. However, it runs contrary to evidence
from correlation studies that executive function and
ToM are fundamentally linked in development [9].
One explanation for this discrepancy may be the
extent to which more formal tests of mentalizing ability
also tap on executive functions. Clearly successful rea-
soning about mental states could well demand some
level of executive skill. For example, in the standard,
unexpected-location false belief task, young children
who have relatively poor inhibitory control could find it
a challenge to resist pointing out the obvious location of
the object in question[26]. The more naturalistic setting
of the SAT and mSAT may be less demanding of execu-
tive resources.
Limitations
Our assessment of executive functioning and social
attribution correlations had a number of limitations. A
more comprehensive executive function battery would
better define any relationship between SAT performance
and cognitive ability. For example, inclusion of more
specific tasks dissecting only one component of execu-
tive functioning and linguistic ability, such as Hayling
Sentence Completion (for semantic inhibition) might
have been appropriate. Despite the fact that we con-
trolled for verbal IQ and age, neither the SAT or mSAT
should be considered completely independent of linguis-
tic expertise since social attribution ability is scored
from a verbal response. In future it would be useful to
rise to the challenge of designing tasks to capture men-
talizing skills in individuals with poor language. Such
Table 5 Partial correlation analyses between SAT and mSAT Indices and Executive Functions in healthy school-aged
children, controlled for age and VIQ (N = 120)
SAT Proposition Pertinence Salience ToM-C ToM-A Animation Person Problem-solving
Stroop-RT .051 .030 .051 .157 .099 .070 .063 .019
Stroop-ERR .036 -.014 .040 .028 .048 .090 .060 -.049
WCST-CA .111 -.001 .089 .059 .085 .035 .074 .225*
WCST-PR -.023 .014 -.033 .114 -.044 .045 .037 .053
WCST-PE .008 .045 .029 .113 .059 .058 .067 .086
VF .001 .078 .041 .080 .037 .073 .014 .052
mSAT Proposition Pertinence Salience ToM-C ToM-A Animation Person Problem
-solving
Stroop-RT -.007 .100 -.038 .064 .007 -.029 .044 -.002
Stroop-ERR -.007 -.023 -.001 -.049 .006 -.055 -.004 .119
WCST-CA -.125 .145 -.174 -.085 -.035 .067 -.117 .009
WCST-PR .058 -.131 .108 -.042 .034 -.019 -.029 .013
WCST-PE .058 -.126 .105 -.071 .020 -.034 -.031 -.011
VF .311*** .020 .240** -.036 -.064 .100 -.061 .017
Stroop-RT: Reaction Time Stroop word-color interference. Stroop-ERR: Errors Stroop word-color interference. WCST-CA: Categories completed Wisconsin Card
Sorting Test. WCST-PR: Perseverative responses Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. WCST-PE: Perseverative errors Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. VFT: Verbal Fluency.
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tasks would also help establish what role language plays
in performance of able individuals with autism spectrum
who do successfully pass standard ToM tasks [27]. It
should also be remembered that our mapping of the
maturation of social attribution skills is cross-sectional.
We accept that longitudinal designs are a more valid
and reliable means of assessing developmental change
and will be required to verify our results. Further valida-
tion of the mSAT will be required in order to determine
test-retest reliabilities and improve inter-rater reliabil-
ities on its indices. Finally, the present findings are a
record of behavioral observations, in future studies it
would be interesting to employ concurrent functional
neuroimaging techniques to track the development of
the fundamental neural systems underpinning social
ability.
Conclusions
Our data indicates that social attribution ability
improves with age. However, a modified version of the
SAT was more sensitive to age-related changes in chil-
dren between the ages of 6 - 9 years old. This important
observation should be borne in mind when extending
the study of social attribution to children with develop-
mental disorders in this age group. Clearly a floor effect
in typically developing children would mask any
between group differences in social attribution. The
mSAT described in the present study is available from
the authors on request. We hope it can make a useful
contribution to the assessment of children with social
difficulties and potentially be applied to assess the utility
of interventions aimed at improving theory of mind
skills.
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